About this product

Product Identifiers

PublisherSpringer Netherlands

ISBN-101402091974

ISBN-139781402091971

eBay Product ID (ePID)71167701

Product Key Features

Number of PagesX, 354 Pages

LanguageEnglish

Publication NameDegrees of Belief

Publication Year2009

SubjectPhilosophy & Social Aspects, Epistemology, Probability & Statistics / General

TypeTextbook

AuthorChristoph Schmidt-Petri

Subject AreaMathematics, Philosophy, Science

SeriesSynthese Library

FormatHardcover

Dimensions

Item Weight54 Oz

Item Length9.3 in

Item Width6.1 in

Additional Product Features

Intended AudienceScholarly & Professional

LCCN2008-935558

Dewey Edition22

ReviewsFrom the reviews: "Degrees of Belief is a strong collection of essays distinguished by its inclusion of an unusually wide array of approaches to understanding its subject. ... the book is best suited for formally proficient advanced students (graduate or upper-level undergraduate) or professionals seeking to explore other approaches to degree of belief than the ones in which they currently work. ... Degrees of Belief is an excellent springboard for exploring the many approaches to degrees of belief currently being investigated in the literature." (Lyle Zynda, Metascience, Vol. 21, 2012) "This is a fascinating collection that brings together issues in traditional and formal epistemology, and succeeds in posing new challenges for both. Especially notable are the arguments for and against attempted justification of probability representations of opinion, with special reference to self-locating beliefs and rules for updating." Bas C. van Fraassen, San Francisco State University "This is a splendid collection of essays on degrees of belief. Contributions are from the leading figures in the field, and, consequently, it contains an authoritative survey and assessment of current accounts of degrees of belief. [...] the essays are so clear and general that the book also provides an excellent overview of the field for the non-expert." Frank Arntzenius, University College, Oxford University "Modern Bayesian probabilism sometimes seems under threat from two fronts. Some theorists think that Bayesians can't make sense of traditional concepts such as belief and knowledge. Other theorists think that restrictions on degrees of belief given by probability theory are too restrictive. This collection includes state of the art work on both of these challenges, with both the challenges and the responses well represented. Anyone interested in formal epistemology, or in the implications of formalepistemology for philosophy in general, should read this collection." Brian Weatherson, Rutgers University, From the reviews: "Degrees of Belief is a strong collection of essays distinguished by its inclusion of an unusually wide array of approaches to understanding its subject. ... the book is best suited for formally proficient advanced students (graduate or upper-level undergraduate) or professionals seeking to explore other approaches to degree of belief than the ones in which they currently work. ... Degrees of Belief is an excellent springboard for exploring the many approaches to degrees of belief currently being investigated in the literature." (Lyle Zynda, Metascience, Vol. 21, 2012) "This is a fascinating collection that brings together issues in traditional and formal epistemology, and succeeds in posing new challenges for both. Especially notable are the arguments for and against attempted justification of probability representations of opinion, with special reference to self-locating beliefs and rules for updating." Bas C. van Fraassen, San Francisco State University "This is a splendid collection of essays on degrees of belief. Contributions are from the leading figures in the field, and, consequently, it contains an authoritative survey and assessment of current accounts of degrees of belief. [...] the essays are so clear and general that the book also provides an excellent overview of the field for the non-expert." Frank Arntzenius, University College, Oxford University "Modern Bayesian probabilism sometimes seems under threat from two fronts. Some theorists think that Bayesians can't make sense of traditional concepts such as belief and knowledge. Other theorists think that restrictions on degrees of belief given by probability theory are too restrictive. This collection includes state of the art work on both of these challenges, with both the challenges and the responses well represented. Anyone interested in formal epistemology, or in the implications of formal epistemology for philosophy in general, should read this collection." Brian Weatherson, Rutgers University, This is a fascinating collection that brings together issues in traditional and formal epistemology, and succeeds in posing new challenges for both. Especially notable are the arguments for and against attempted justification of probability representations of opinion, with special reference to self-locating beliefs and rules for updating. Bas C. van Fraassen, San Francisco State UniversityThis is a splendid collection of essays on degrees of belief. Contributions are from the leading figures in the field, and, consequently, it contains an authoritative survey and assessment of current accounts of degrees of belief. [...] the essays are so clear and general that the book also provides an excellent overview of the field for the non-expert. Frank Arntzenius, University College, Oxford UniversityModern Bayesian probabilism sometimes seems under threat from two fronts. Some theorists think that Bayesians can't make sense of traditional concepts such as belief and knowledge. Other theorists think that restrictions on degrees of belief given by probability theory are too restrictive. This collection includes state of the art work on both of these challenges, with both the challenges and the responses well represented. Anyone interested in formal epistemology, or in the implications of formal epistemology for philosophy in general, should read this collection. Brian Weatherson, Rutgers University, This is a fascinating collection that brings together issues in traditional and formal epistemology, and succeeds in posing new challenges for both. Especially notable are the arguments for and against attempted justification of probability representations of opinion, with special reference to self-locating beliefs and rules for updating. Bas C. van Fraassen, San Francisco State University This is a splendid collection of essays on degrees of belief. Contributions are from the leading figures in the field, and, consequently, it contains an authoritative survey and assessment of current accounts of degrees of belief. [...] the essays are so clear and general that the book also provides an excellent overview of the field for the non-expert. Frank Arntzenius, University College, Oxford University Modern Bayesian probabilism sometimes seems under threat from two fronts. Some theorists think that Bayesians can't make sense of traditional concepts such as belief and knowledge. Other theorists think that restrictions on degrees of belief given by probability theory are too restrictive. This collection includes state of the art work on both of these challenges, with both the challenges and the responses well represented. Anyone interested in formal epistemology, or in the implications of formal epistemology for philosophy in general, should read this collection. Brian Weatherson, Rutgers University

Series Volume Number342

Number of Volumes1 vol.

IllustratedYes

Dewey Decimal121.6

Table Of ContentBelief and Degrees of Belief.- Belief and Degrees of Belief.- Plain Belief and Degrees of Belief.- Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis.- The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief.- Partial Belief and Flat-Out Belief.- What Laws Should Degrees of Belief Obey'.- Epistemic Probability and Coherent Degrees of Belief.- Non-Additive Degrees of Belief.- Accepted Beliefs, Revision and Bipolarity in the Possibilistic Framework.- A Survey of Ranking Theory.- Arguments For--Or Against--Probabilism'.- Diachronic Coherence and Radical Probabilism.- Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief.- Logical Approaches.- Degrees All the Way Down: Beliefs, Non-Beliefs and Disbeliefs.- Levels of Belief in Nonmonotonic Reasoning.

SynopsisThis anthology is the first book to give a balanced overview of the competing theories of degrees of belief. It also explicitly relates these debates to more traditional concerns of the philosophy of language and mind and epistemic logic., This book has grown out of a conference on "Degrees of Belief" that was held at the University of Konstanz in July 2004, organised by Luc Bovens, Wolfgang Spohn, and the editors. The event was supported by the German Research Fo- dation (DFG), the Philosophy, Probability, and Modeling (PPM) Group, and the CenterforJuniorResearchFellows(since2008: Zukunftskolleg)attheUniversityof Konstanz. The PPM Group itself - of which the editors were members at the time - was sponsored by a So a Kovalevskaja Award by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, the Federal Ministry of Education and Research, and the Program for the Investment in the Future (ZIP) of the German Government to Luc Bovens, who co-directed the PPM Group with Stephan Hartmann. The publication of this book received further support from the Emmy Noether Junior Research Group Formal Epistemology at the Zukunftskolleg and the Department of Philosophy at the U- versity of Konstanz, directed by Franz Huber, and funded by the DFG. We thank everyone involved for their support. Dedicated to the memory of Philippe Smets and Henry Kyburg. Konstanz, Germany Franz Huber Christoph Schmidt-Petri v Contents Belief and Degrees of Belief. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Franz Huber Part I Plain Belief and Degrees of Belief Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Richard Foley The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 James Hawthorne Partial Belief and Flat-Out Belief. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Keith Frankish Part II What Laws Should Degrees of Belief Obey? Epistemic Probability and Coherent Degrees of Belief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., This book has grown out of a conference on "Degrees of Belief" that was held at the University of Konstanz in July 2004, organised by Luc Bovens, Wolfgang Spohn, and the editors. The event was supported by the German Research Fo- dation (DFG), the Philosophy, Probability, and Modeling (PPM) Group, and the CenterforJuniorResearchFellows(since2008:Zukunftskolleg)attheUniversityof Konstanz. The PPM Group itself - of which the editors were members at the time - was sponsored by a So a Kovalevskaja Award by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, the Federal Ministry of Education and Research, and the Program for the Investment in the Future (ZIP) of the German Government to Luc Bovens, who co-directed the PPM Group with Stephan Hartmann. The publication of this book received further support from the Emmy Noether Junior Research Group Formal Epistemology at the Zukunftskolleg and the Department of Philosophy at the U- versity of Konstanz, directed by Franz Huber, and funded by the DFG. We thank everyone involved for their support. Dedicated to the memory of Philippe Smets and Henry Kyburg. Konstanz, Germany Franz Huber Christoph Schmidt-Petri v Contents Belief and Degrees of Belief. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Franz Huber Part I Plain Belief and Degrees of Belief Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Richard Foley The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 James Hawthorne Partial Belief and Flat-Out Belief. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Keith Frankish Part II What Laws Should Degrees of Belief Obey? Epistemic Probability and Coherent Degrees of Belief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., Belief and Degrees of Belief.- Belief and Degrees of Belief.- Plain Belief and Degrees of Belief.- Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis.- The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief.- Partial Belief and Flat-Out Belief.- What Laws Should Degrees of Belief Obey?.- Epistemic Probability and Coherent Degrees of Belief.- Non-Additive Degrees of Belief.- Accepted Beliefs, Revision and Bipolarity in the Possibilistic Framework.- A Survey of Ranking Theory.- Arguments For-Or Against-Probabilism?.- Diachronic Coherence and Radical Probabilism.- Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief.- Logical Approaches.- Degrees All the Way Down: Beliefs, Non-Beliefs and Disbeliefs.- Levels of Belief in Nonmonotonic Reasoning.

LC Classification NumberBD143-237