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Great Debates in Philosophy Ser.: Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity by Gilbert Harman and Judith Thomson (1996, Trade Paperback)

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Do moral questions have objective answers? In this great debate, Gilbert Harman explains and argues for relativism, emotivism, and moral scepticism. In his view, moral disagreements are like disagreements about what to pay for a house; there are no correct answers ahead of time, except in relation to one or another moral framework. Independently, Judith Jarvis Thomson examines what she takes to be the case against moral objectivity, and rejects it; she argues that it is possible to find out the correct answers to some moral questions. In her view, some moral disagreements are like disagreements about whether the house has a ghost. Harman and Thomson then reply to each other. This important, lively accessible exchange will be invaluable to all students of moral theory and meta-ethics.

About this product

Product Identifiers

PublisherWiley & Sons, Incorporated, John

ISBN-100631192115

ISBN-139780631192114

eBay Product ID (ePID)275549

Product Key Features

Number of Pages240 Pages

Publication NameMoral Relativism and Moral Objectivity

LanguageEnglish

Publication Year1996

SubjectEpistemology, Ethics & Moral Philosophy

TypeTextbook

Subject AreaPhilosophy

AuthorGilbert Harman, Judith Thomson

SeriesGreat Debates in Philosophy Ser.

FormatTrade Paperback

Dimensions

Item Height0.7 in

Item Weight12.8 Oz

Item Length9.1 in

Item Width6 in

Additional Product Features

Intended AudienceScholarly & Professional

LCCN95-012472

Dewey Edition21

IllustratedYes

Dewey Decimal171.7

Table Of ContentPreface. Part I: Moral Relativism (Harman): . 1. Moral Relativism. 2. Social Contracts. 3. Expressing Basic Disagreement. 4. Universality of Practical Reasons'. 5. Judgements about Outsiders. Part II: Moral Objectivity (Thomson): . 6. Epistemological Arguments for Moral Skepticism. 7. Emotivism. 8. Evaluations and Directives. Part III: Responses: . 9. Harman's Response to Thomson's Part II. 10. Thomson's Response to Harman's Part I. Bibliography.

SynopsisDo moral questions have objective answers? In this great debate, Gilbert Harman explains and argues for relativism, emotivism, and moral scepticism. In his view, moral disagreements are like disagreements about what to pay for a house; there are no correct answers ahead of time, except in relation to one or another moral framework. Independently, Judith Jarvis Thomson examines what she takes to be the case against moral objectivity, and rejects it; she argues that it is possible to find out the correct answers to some moral questions. In her view, some moral disagreements are like disagreements about whether the house has a ghost. Harman and Thomson then reply to each other. This important, lively accessible exchange will be invaluable to all students of moral theory and meta-ethics., Do moral questions have objective answers? In this great debate, Gilbert Harman explains and argues for relativism, emotivism, and moral scepticism. In his view, moral disagreements are like disagreements about what to pay for a house; there are no correct answers ahead of time, except in relation to one or another moral framework.

LC Classification NumberBJ1012.H316 1996