Picture 1 of 1

Stock photo

Military Persuasion In War And Policy: The Power Of Soft - Picture 1 of 1

Military Persuasion in War and Policy : The Power of Soft by Stephen J. Cimbala (2002, Hardcover)

Prepbooks (224085)

99.4% positive feedback

Price:

$113.78

Free shipping

Estimated delivery Sat, Aug 30 - Fri, Sep 5

Returns:

30 days returns. Buyer pays for return shipping. If you use an eBay shipping label, it will be deducted from your refund amount.

Condition:

Brand New

Number of Pages: 280. Author: Cimbala, Stephen (Author). Weight: 1.23 lbs. Publication Date: 2002-10-30. Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing PLC.

About this product

Product Identifiers

PublisherBloomsbury Publishing USA

ISBN-100275978036

ISBN-139780275978037

eBay Product ID (ePID)2272099

Product Key Features

Number of Pages280 Pages

LanguageEnglish

Publication NameMilitary Persuasion in War and Policy : the Power of Soft

Publication Year2002

SubjectPublic Policy / Military Policy, Military / Strategy, Military / General, World / General, Security (National & International)

TypeTextbook

AuthorStephen J. Cimbala

Subject AreaPolitical Science, History

FormatHardcover

Dimensions

Item Height0.7 in

Item Weight20.2 Oz

Item Length9.2 in

Item Width6.1 in

Additional Product Features

Intended AudienceCollege Audience

LCCN2002-021571

Dewey Edition21

Number of Volumes1 vol.

IllustratedYes

Dewey Decimal355/.0335

Table Of ContentThe Idea of Military Persuasion Military Persuasion: The Idea and Some Examples Military Persuasion and Psychological Strategy Technology and Deterrence in Military Persuasion Examples from the Past Military Persuasion in the Cuban Missile Crisis Military Persuasion in Desert Storm Intelligence and Military Persuasion: The 1983 "War Scare" Future Problems Friction and Nuclear Deterrence Military Persuasion and Small Wars Nuclear Weapons and Cyber War: Persuasive Deadlock? Conclusion Bibliography Index

SynopsisCimbala analyzes military persuasion--the art of using armed force to support diplomacy, deterrence, crisis management, unconventional conflicts, peace operations, and other military activities short of major conventional war. As he shows, military persuasion requires that policy makers and diplomats understand the subtle interaction between force and diplomacy; each supports, or destroys, the other, depending upon the situation. Even conventional wars have aspects of armed persuasion. The Powell doctrine that calls for overwhelming force in case of any U.S. military intervention was not even employed by then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell in the Gulf War of 1991, despite the popular impression to the contrary. Since U.S. policy is not based on imperial policing, but on constructive engagement with the object of supporting democratic regimes and market economies, the use of deterrence and limited military commitments of highly trained, specialized warrior-diplomats will be typical of 21st century-conflicts. As Cimbala shows in his various case studies, armed forces are used most of the time for coercion, not for mass destruction. Yet much professional military thinking, expert lay opinion, and U.S. government analysis presupposes that there is a clear dividing line between all-out peace and all-out war. In addition, U.S. political culture is insensitive to the requirement for matching the political objective to the military means available, as opposed to clamoring for a psychologically satisfying form of victory. Despite these apparent obstacles, Cimbala maintains that the United States must master military persuasion because its resources for defense are limited and its commitments are ubiquitous. This book will be of particular interest to scholars, students, and professionals involved with defense, security, and foreign policy studies.

LC Classification NumberUA23