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Theories of Institutional Design Ser.: Democratic Devices and Desires by Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin (2000, Trade Paperback)
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About this product
Product Identifiers
PublisherCambridge University Press
ISBN-100521639778
ISBN-139780521639774
eBay Product ID (ePID)1619145
Product Key Features
Number of Pages278 Pages
Publication NameDemocratic Devices and Desires
LanguageEnglish
SubjectHistory & Theory, General, Political Ideologies / Democracy
Publication Year2000
TypeTextbook
Subject AreaPolitical Science
AuthorGeoffrey Brennan, Alan Hamlin
SeriesTheories of Institutional Design Ser.
FormatTrade Paperback
Dimensions
Item Height0.6 in
Item Weight13.4 Oz
Item Length9 in
Item Width6 in
Additional Product Features
Intended AudienceScholarly & Professional
LCCN99-036185
Dewey Edition21
IllustratedYes
Dewey Decimal321.8
Table Of Content1. Introduction; Part I. Democratic Desires: 2. On human nature: beyond homo economicus; 3. Moral dispositions; 4. Economizing on virtue; 5. Political mechanisms; 6. Mechanisms and dispositional choice; 7. Problems of democratic politics; Part II. Democratic Devices: 8. Voting and elections; 9. Political representation; 10. Political parties; 11. The separation of powers; 12. The division of power.
SynopsisThis book offers a novel approach to the analysis of democracy, and an application of that approach to a variety of democratic institutions, including elections, representation, political parties and the separation of powers. Standard economic approaches to politics concentrate on the design of institutions and the role of individuals motivated by self-interest. The authors incorporate a broader view of political motivation, assuming individuals are moral as well as rational, and provide a wide-ranging discussion of the design of democratic institutions., This book offers an approach to the analysis of democracy, and an application of that approach to a variety of democratic institutions, including elections, representation, parties and the separation of powers. They develop standard economic approaches to politics by assuming individuals are moral, as well as rational and self-interested., This book offers an account of key features of modern representative democracy. Working from the rational actor tradition, it builds a middle ground between orthodox political theory and the economic analysis of politics. Standard economic models of politics emphasise the design of the institutional devices of democracy as operated by essentially self-interested individuals. This book departs from that model by focusing on democratic desires alongside democratic devices, stressing that important aspects of democracy depend on the motivation of democrats and the interplay between devices and desires. Individuals are taken to be not only rational, but also somewhat moral. The authors argue that this approach provides access to aspects of the debate on democratic institutions that are beyond the narrowly economic model. They apply their analysis to voting, elections, representation, political departments and the separation and division of powers, providing a wide-ranging discussion of the design of democratic institutions.
LC Classification NumberJC423 .B783 2000
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