About this product

Product Identifiers

PublisherNow Publishers

ISBN-101680833022

ISBN-139781680833027

eBay Product ID (ePID)239689227

Product Key Features

Number of Pages128 Pages

Publication NameSecure Processors Part II : Intel Sgx Security Analysis and Mit Sanctum Architecture

LanguageEnglish

Publication Year2017

SubjectNetworking / General, Electrical

TypeTextbook

Subject AreaComputers, Technology & Engineering

AuthorVictor Costan, Ilia Lebedev, Srinivas Devadas

SeriesFoundations and Trends in Electronic Design Automation Ser.

FormatTrade Paperback

Dimensions

Item Height0.3 in

Item Weight6.8 Oz

Item Length9.2 in

Item Width6.1 in

Additional Product Features

Intended AudienceScholarly & Professional

Series Volume NumberVol. 35

IllustratedYes

Table Of Content1: Introduction 2: An Analysis of Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX) 3: The MIT Sanctum Processor 4: Conclusion 5: Acknowledgements. References.

SynopsisSurveys the state of the art in secure processor systems, with a specific focus on remote software attestation and software isolation. This two part work advocates a principled, transparent approach to system design, and argues that practical guarantees of privacy and integrity for remote computation are achievable., This manuscript is the second in a two part survey and analysis of the state of the art in secure processor systems, with a specific focus on remote software attestation and software isolation. The first part established the taxonomy and prerequisite concepts relevant to an examination of the state of the art in trusted remote computation: attested software isolation containers (enclaves). This second part extends Part I's description of Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX), an available and documented enclave-capable system, with a rigorous security analysis of SGX as a system for trusted remote computation. This part documents the authors' concerns over the shortcomings of SGX as a secure system and introduces the MIT Sanctum processor developed by the authors: a system designed to offer stronger security guarantees, lend itself better to analysis and formal verification, and offer a more straightforward and complete threat model than the Intel system, all with an equivalent programming model. This two part work advocates a principled, transparent, and wellscrutinized approach to system design, and argues that practical guarantees of privacy and integrity for remote computation are achievable at a reasonable design cost and performance overhead., This monograph is the second of a two-part survey and analysis of the state of the art in secure processor systems, with a speciFic focus on remote software attestation and software isolation. The First part established the taxonomy and prerequisite concepts relevant to an examination of the state of the art in trusted remote computation: attested software isolation containers (enclaves). second part extends Part I's description of Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX), an available and documented enclave-capable system, with a rigorous security analysis of SGX as a system for trusted remote computation. This part documents the authors' concerns over the shortcomings of SGX as a secure system and introduces the MIT Sanctum processor developed by the authors: a system designed to oer stronger security guarantees, lend itself better to analysis and formal veriFication, and oer a more straightforward and complete threat model than the Intel system, all with an equivalent programming model. This two-part work advocates a principled, transparent, and well scrutinized approach to system design, and argues that practical guarantees of privacy and integrity for remote computation are achievable at a reasonable design cost and performance overhead. See also: Secure Processors Part I: Background, Taxonomy for Secure Enclaves and Intel SGX Architecture (ISBN 978-1-68083-300-3). Part I of this survey establishes the taxonomy and prerequisite concepts relevant to an examination of the state of the art in trusted remote computation: attested software isolation containers (enclaves).