Picture 1 of 1
Stock photo
Picture 1 of 1
Stock photo
Success and Failure in Limited War : Information and Strategy in the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf, and Iraq Wars by Spencer D. Bakich (2014, Trade Paperback)
ZUBER (262898)
97.8% positive feedback
Price:
$35.95
Free shipping
Returns:
30 days returns. Seller pays for return shipping.
Condition:
SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN LIMITED WAR: INFORMATION AND STRATEGY IN THE KOREAN, VIETNAM, PERSIAN GULF, AND IRAQ WARS By Spencer D. Bakich **BRAND NEW**.
- Buy It NowSUCCESS AND FAILURE IN LIMITED WAR: INFORMATION AND By Spencer D. Bakich **NEW**
Oops! Looks like we're having trouble connecting to our server.
Refresh your browser window to try again.
About this product
Product Identifiers
PublisherUniversity of Chicago Press
ISBN-10022610771X
ISBN-139780226107714
eBay Product ID (ePID)12038242014
Product Key Features
Number of Pages344 Pages
Publication NameSuccess and Failure in Limited War : Information and Strategy in the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf, and Iraq Wars
LanguageEnglish
Publication Year2014
SubjectMilitary / Korean War, Intelligence & Espionage, Military / Vietnam War, Military / Iraq War (2003-2011), Military / United States, International Relations / General, Military / Persian Gulf War (1991), Security (National & International)
TypeTextbook
AuthorSpencer D. Bakich
Subject AreaPolitical Science, History
FormatTrade Paperback
Dimensions
Item Height0.1 in
Item Weight18.3 Oz
Item Length0.9 in
Item Width0.6 in
Additional Product Features
Intended AudienceScholarly & Professional
LCCN2013-022422
Dewey Edition23
ReviewsEven more than most enterprises, limited wars are characterized by uncertainty, and Bakich's great contribution is to focus on the role of institutions that gather and process information in influencing their outcomes. With a good theory involving both diplomats and the armed forces and thorough case studies, this book is both fascinating and important., Bakich here offers a rigorous and well researched study, which makes the link between analysis of foreign policy, strategic studies, and international relations., Despite all the interest in preparing for short, sharp wars, including counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts at various operational levels, no effective conceptual basis for such conflicts has been formulated. In Success and Failure in Limited War , Bakich has taken a big step toward plugging that gap by stressing and clarifying the much tighter bonds between military action and diplomacy in limited wars. . . . The author's approach really proves its worth in explaining the debacle of the second Iraq war. His analysis of the co-optation of intelligence, the virtual crippling of the National Security Council, and systemic organizational flaws is both compelling and deeply troubling. . . . Bakich has opened a rich new vein of research into international relations in matters of war and peace. Success and Failure in Limited War will inform and guide future students of civil and military decision-making in crisis and conflict for years to come., Bakich addresses an important puzzle--the sources of mixed strategic success in US experience with limited wars since World War II--by advancing a novel argument concerning the role of 'information institutions.' Success and Failure in Limited War provides a very useful framework that both complements the mountain of historical and decision making literature on the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, as well as integrates emerging insights from many insiders regarding contemporary decision-making in the two Iraq wars. The real payoff: Bakich compensates for gaps in the dominant realist, domestic politics, and constructivist arguments., Even more than most enterprises, limited wars are characterized by uncertainty, and Bakich's great contribution is to focus on the role of institutions that gather and process information in influencing their outcomes. With a good theory involving both diplomats and the armed forces and thorough case studies, this book is both fascinating and important., Bakich addresses an important puzzle-the sources of mixed strategic success in US experience with limited wars since World War II-by advancing a novel argument concerning the role of 'information institutions.' Success and Failure in Limited War provides a very useful framework that both complements the mountain of historical and decision making literature on the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, as well as integrates emerging insights from many insiders regarding contemporary decision-making in the two Iraq wars. The real payoff: Bakich compensates for gaps in the dominant realist, domestic politics, and constructivist arguments., Bakich has given us a 'must read' study: he brilliantly explains how information flows (and their absence) definitively shape the success of wartime decision making and he provides a highly readable history of the limited wars that have consumed US foreign policy over the past sixty years. Policy makers, scholars, and students alike will find this book invaluable., Bakich addresses an important puzzle-the sources of mixed strategic success in US experience with limited wars since World War II-by advancing a novel argument concerning the role of 'information institutions.' Success and Failure in Limited War provides a very useful framework that both complements the mountain of historical and decision-making literature on the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, as well as integrates emerging insights from many insiders regarding contemporary decision-making in the two Iraq wars. The real payoff: Bakich compensates for gaps in the dominant realist, domestic politics, and constructivist arguments., Well-researched. . . . Bakich's theoretical approach proves to be a useful tool in discovering some of the causes for success or failure and lays out very clearly how flaws in a state's information institutions can have disastrous consequences in limited war. He gives policy makers and thinkers places to look to find hidden dysfunctions and provides a very convincing case against stove piping and relying too much on a sole institution for analysis., This groundbreaking treatise . . . endeavors to explain America's mixed success with limited war since 1950 by way of a new theoretical approach to analyzing policy-strategy formulation and execution at the highest levels of government. . . . With over eight hundred endnotes gleaned from more than four hundred authoritative sources, this is first and foremost a scholarly work. Those in the international relations community seeking to understand the puzzle of America's recent strategic performance in limited wars will find this information institutions approach a worthy adjunct to the more established theories. Those who read purely for pleasure will enjoy the four case studies, each offering a unique take on the various policies and strategies crafted and the decisions made at the highest levels of government. In short, the book has much to offer, to the serious reader and dilettante alike., The book demonstrates how psychological inclinations can be checked and shaped by institutional context, as well as the idea that leaders can acquire useful information about their opponents even in the absence of costly signaling. Bakich thus presents a promising framework for thinking about policy making during limited wars as well as other endeavors where it is difficult to alleviate uncertainty.
Dewey Decimal355.00973
Table Of ContentAcknowledgments Abbreviations Chapter One Information Institutions and Strategy in War Chapter Two Explaining Strategic Performance in Limited Warfare Chapter Three Military and Diplomatic Defeat in the Korean War Chapter Four The Vietnam War, Little Consolation Chapter Five Military and Diplomatic Success in the Persian Gulf War Chapter Six Iraq--Win the Battle, Lose the War Chapter Seven Information Institutions Matter! Notes Bibliography Index
SynopsisCommon and destructive, limited wars are significant international events that pose a number of challenges to the states involved beyond simple victory or defeat. Chief among these challenges is the risk of escalation-be it in the scale, scope, cost, or duration of the conflict. In this book, Spencer D. Bakich investigates a crucial and heretofore ignored factor in determining the nature and direction of limited war: information institutions. Traditional assessments of wartime strategy focus on the relationship between the military and civilians, but Bakich argues that we must take into account the information flow patterns among top policy makers and all national security organizations. By examining the fate of American military and diplomatic strategy in four limited wars, Bakich demonstrates how not only the availability and quality of information, but also the ways in which information is gathered, managed, analyzed, and used, shape a state's ability to wield power effectively in dynamic and complex international systems. Utilizing a range of primary and secondary source materials, Success and Failure in Limited War makes a timely case for the power of information in war, with crucial implications for international relations theory and statecraft., The American government and military have increasingly recognized that information collection, analysis, and sharing are essential to security. While the availability of information is important, quality decision making depends on sound and effective information institutions that allow leaders to understand the complex strategic environments in which they act, so they can effectively coordinate between the military and diplomatic elements of limited war strategies. In an era of power transitions and power diffusions, the ability of the United States to act intelligently will depend on how strategic information is managed and used. In America at Limited War Spencer Bakich demonstrates how the pattern of information flow in the national security bureaucracy directly affected the outcomes of significant foreign policy events in the past seven decades: Korean, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, and Iraq wars. Each began as limited wars, and escalated beyond the expected, at costs far exceeding what was desired. The book explains why the US was able to succeed across the board in the Persian Gulf War, but unable to both defeat its opponent and avoid escalation in Korea;why the US was able to avoid inducing Chinese intervention in Vietnam, but incapable of defeating its primary opponent in the South;and why the US was able to achieve a decisive victory over Iraqi forces in a very short period of time only to have that success squandered with the eruption of the Sunni-based insurgency.Bakich brings information into the mix of actors that have been scrutinized extensively in international relations, and provides a deeper understanding of how and when states can wield power effectively in a competitive international system. , Common and destructive, limited wars are significant international events that pose a number of challenges to the states involved beyond simple victory or defeat. Chief among these challenges is the risk of escalationbe it in the scale, scope, cost, or duration of the conflict. In this book, Spencer D. Bakich investigates a crucial and heretofore ignored factor in determining the nature and direction of limited war: information institutions. Traditional assessments of wartime strategy focus on the relationship between the military and civilians, but Bakich argues that we must take into account the information flow patterns among top policy makers and all national security organizations. By examining the fate of American military and diplomatic strategy in four limited wars, Bakich demonstrates how not only the availability and quality of information, but also the ways in which information is gathered, managed, analyzed, and used, shape a state s ability to wield power effectively in dynamic and complex international systems. Utilizing a range of primary and secondary source materials, Success and Failure in Limited War makes a timely case for the power of information in war, with crucial implications for international relations theory and statecraft.", Common and destructive, limited wars are significant international events that pose a number of challenges to the states involved beyond simple victory or defeat. Chief among these challenges is the risk of escalation--be it in the scale, scope, cost, or duration of the conflict. In this book, Spencer D. Bakich investigates a crucial and heretofore ignored factor in determining the nature and direction of limited war: information institutions. Traditional assessments of wartime strategy focus on the relationship between the military and civilians, but Bakich argues that we must take into account the information flow patterns among top policy makers and all national security organizations. By examining the fate of American military and diplomatic strategy in four limited wars, Bakich demonstrates how not only the availability and quality of information, but also the ways in which information is gathered, managed, analyzed, and used, shape a state's ability to wield power effectively in dynamic and complex international systems. Utilizing a range of primary and secondary source materials, Success and Failure in Limited War makes a timely case for the power of information in war, with crucial implications for international relations theory and statecraft.
LC Classification NumberE745.B35 2014
All listings for this product
Be the first to write a review
